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Poverty and fertility are two important and closely related aspects of welfare. In this 
paper we use unique longitudinal data sources to study the relationship between 
poverty and fertility at household level in Albania, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
These countries differ greatly in their history, average income, social structure, 
economic institutions and demographic features. We find that there is a substantial 
difference in the relative importance of the determinants of poverty dynamics and 
fertility; the persistence of high levels of fertility and poverty in Ethiopia is driven by 
lack of economic growth and poor access to family planning; education and health 
provision are crucial elements in reducing poverty and fertility, as is clear from 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Albania.  
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  1I.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between poverty and fertility is a long contested issue among 
demographers and economists. The general empirical observation that poorer countries tend 
to have higher population growth rates and that larger households tend to be poorer, underlies 
the presumption of a positive causal relation between poverty and fertility at the national and 
household levels respectively. The macro level argument relies on the neo-classical paradigm 
that higher population growth rate depresses capital accumulation and wages. Poverty in turn 
is considered a key factor driving high fertility and therefore high rates of population growth, 
consequently delaying the demographic transition. The standard micro  argument is that 
households relying on primitive farming technologies have a greater need for cheap labour, 
and therefore a higher demand for children. Lack of state benefits and pensions may also 
increase demand for children is a means of insurance or security in old age. Consequently 
perceived costs and benefits of children, and thus fertility behaviour, depend on economic 
forces, social organisations, but also cultural patterns. As such the poverty/fertility 
relationship is contingent upon social and institutional characteristics, including education, 
family planning and health services. However, these factors do not remain constant over 
time. Over the last two decades developing countries have shown rather different paths in 
terms of the fertility transition and economic progress. Some countries have witnessed sharp 
fertility decline and impressive economic growth, whereas others have remained static with 
high fertility levels, low economic growth and persistent poverty.  
There is a rather substantial literature concerned with the interaction of poverty and 
fertility
1. However, the great majority has relied either on cross sectional or aggregate level 
data. We revisit this issue by exploiting recent longitudinal micro level data. By emphasising 
the comparative and dynamic perspectives we produce new insights which cannot be derived 
from cross sectional data. In particular, we assess to what extent children are associated with 
  2changes in poverty among households over time, and the role of poverty on fertility 
behaviour in a dynamic perspective. Given the richness of the micro level data we also assess 
the role of human capital and other important background variables. We perform the analysis 
for four countries: Albania, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Only Ethiopia is still facing 
high levels of fertility, low economic growth, and extreme poverty. Comparing Ethiopia with 
the other three, which has fared considerably better both in economic progress and fertility 
decline, provide an excellent basis for assessing commonalities and differences of the various 
channels for which poverty and fertility interacts, emphasising how these relate to the 
country specific characteristics, such as religion, culture and political situation.  
Of course the use of longitudinal data has also its drawbacks: available panel data for 
developing countries, which includes information both on fertility and consumption 
expenditure, are few and less comprehensive than panels available for developed countries. 
As a result the selected countries should be considered as case studies rather than a 
representative sample of developing countries. Nevertheless, the use of longitudinal data fills 
an important gap in this literature, and our study should be seen as a first step until more and 
longer panels for developing countries become available.  
We find that in a cross sectional perspective there is always a positive association 
between poverty and number of children. However, our dynamic analysis shows that poor 
households do not necessarily have a higher rate of fertility, but households with many 
children (i.e. high fertility) tend to have a higher rate of entering poverty and lower rate of 
exiting poverty. We also find that for the countries considered, there is a substantial 
difference in the relative importance of the determinants of poverty dynamics and fertility; 
the persistence of high levels of fertility and poverty in Ethiopia is driven by lack of 
economic growth and poor access to family planning; education and health provision are 
  3crucial elements in reducing poverty and fertility, as is clear from Vietnam, Indonesia and 
Albania.  
  The paper is outlined as follows: section II gives an outline of the literature 
emphasising the poverty/fertility relationship; section III gives a brief outline of the 
theoretical perspective and how it is related to the four countries; section IV presents the 
data; section V the empirical analysis, whereas section VI provides discussion and 
conclusions.  
 
II.  PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The existing literature, mainly based on either cross sectional or aggregate data, shows 
that the relationship between poverty and fertility is not unidirectional. Whereas many 
studies suggest a positive relationship between poverty and fertility, others find it to be 
negative, and yet others find it to have an inverse J-shaped relationship. The literature has 
tried to reconcile these discrepancies by differentiating countries by their level of economic 
development and demographic transition. Within the poorest countries, the relationship 
between poverty and fertility is often negative. Fertility appears higher among “wealthier” 
households, which is a result of low reproduction capability and general higher rates of 
infertility among the poor (Lipton 1998; Livi-Bacci and di Santis 1998). Studies from the 60s 
and the 70s pointed to such patterns in rural areas of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan 
and Sierra Leone. The most common relationship between poverty and fertility in 
contemporary less developed countries is however positive. For instance countries with low 
fertility levels during the eighties and the nineties (TFR less than 3.5 – including Vietnam, 
Costa Rica, urban Paraguay, and urban South Africa) and with high fertility levels (TFR 
above 4.5, e.g. Guatemala, Cameroon, Bolivia, Calcutta in India, Belize), as well as medium 
level fertility (TFR between 3.5 and 4.5, e.g. Mexico, rural India, rural South Africa, Brazil, 
  4El Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay), all show a positive relationship. Schoumaker (2004) using 
DHS surveys from sub-Saharan countries supports a general positive relationship. 
 There are however many cases where the positive relationship between poverty and 
fertility is rather weak. Examples include countries in demographic pre-transitional phases 
with very high TFR (e.g. Costa Rica, urban Sudan, Iran, Burkina Faso, Pakistan, urban India, 
rural Philippines) and also during the 90s in countries with relatively low fertility (TFR less 
than 3.5, such as in Maurice and urban Morocco). In some cases, such as rural areas of India 
and Cameroon where fertility rates are very high, the relationship takes the inverse “J shape”, 
implying that both low and high-income households have lower rates of fertility, whereas 
medium level income households have higher fertility. It is argued that very low income 
households tend to be landless farmers, hence less reliant on children as cheap labour, 
whereas those with the highest income has lower fertility due to higher investment in child 
quality. The middle income families are landholding farms which depend on cheap labour, 
and therefore have a higher demand for child quantity, which explains the apparent inverse J-
shape. (see Schoumaker & Tabutin 1999 for further details).  
Of course all of the studies referred to above are based on cross-sectional data, and as 
far as we are aware none have looked at the relationship in a dynamic perspective. However, 
with the emergence of longitudinal data, research on poverty dynamics for developing 
countries is now emerging, though emphasis on fertility is still limited. Examples of this 
literature include Jalan and Ravallion (2000) using a panel from rural China focussing on the 
issue of transient and chronic poverty; Mculloch and Baulch (2000) using a five-year panel 
of 686 households from rural Pakistan showing that large reductions in poverty can be 
achieved through policies aiming at smoothing household incomes – simply because a large 
part of poverty is indeed transitory; Dercon and Krishnan (2000) using three waves of the 
Ethiopian Rural Household Panel (ERHP) shows that individual consumption levels varies 
  5widely by year and season, and indicate that a much larger proportion of households are 
vulnerable to poverty than what cross sectional poverty statistics may suggest
2. Other 
examples of detailed analysis of poverty dynamics include Kedir and McKay (2004), using 
the Ethiopian Urban Household Panel (EUHP), Bigsten et al (2004) using both the ERHP 
and the EUHP, and Justino and Litchfield (2001) analysing poverty dynamics in Vietnam.  
 
III.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND COUNTRY DESCRIPTION 
A positive relationship between fertility and poverty is frequently explained in a 
micro-economic framework: children are considered as an essential part of the household’s 
work force to generate household income, and as insurance against old age. In rural 
underdeveloped regions, which largely rely on primitive farming technology and with no or 
little access to state benefits, this argument makes a great deal of sense. By acquiring 
children the share of household resources available for each member will decrease. 
Moreover, newly born children may decrease the productivity of the mother either by taking 
more resources (such as food) from her or hampering her work prospects. Though 
childbearing may reduce a woman’s working time or decrease her productivity in the short 
run, children may bring more resources as they grow older through work. As such the overall 
net effect of childbearing on poverty is not necessarily clear cut. However, a high number of 
children and their participation in household production are likely to impede investment in 
their human capital (i.e. education), maintaining the low-income status of the household, and 
thereby creating or perpetuating a poverty - fertility trap. As households gain higher income 
and wealth, they often tend to have fewer children either through quantity-quality trade-off 
suggested by Becker and Lewis (1973) or by higher opportunity cost of women associated 
with higher income suggested by Willis (1973).  
  6These demand side arguments rely of course on the fact that couples are able to make 
choices about their fertility. The crucial component in this respect regards access and take-up 
of family planning. Poor availability of family planning means that women will not be able to 
plan their fertility career very well, implying a significant amount of unintended pregnancies 
(Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). There is a negative (though not always strong) relationship 
between availability of family planning and observed fertility levels (– just as there is a 
negative relationship between economic growth and fertility). In other words, family 
planning is often more prevalent in countries that have experienced a great deal of economic 
progress, which is reflected by a higher contraceptive prevalence rate among households with 
higher human capital and wealth. In particular, women with higher earnings and high 
education are more likely to use modern contraceptives. The upshot of this is that 
identification of supply side effects from demand side effects are difficult to establish. For 
instance, family planning tends to be lacking in rural areas which often rely of primitive 
farming technology. This is where we also observe higher fertility rates. But given their 
reliance on primitive farming, these households may also have higher demand for children 
because of access to cheap labour and old age security
3.  
It is useful to assess to what extent the simple theoretical predictions fit into the 
countries that we are presenting in our present study. Table 1 gives summary data on the 
demographic and economic conditions prevailing in the four countries since 1980
4. It is 
immediately clear that they have experienced rather different development paths over the last 
two decades, and that they are at very different levels in terms economic development. The 
country that stands out is Ethiopia where poverty is more severe than in the other three 
countries and more than two-thirds of the population live on less than $2 per day. Despite a 
series of economic reforms gradually being introduced in the late eighties, leading to a more 
mixed economy, the Ethiopian economy remains heavily agriculture-centred with around 
  785% of households being classified as farmers and by any measure the mode of production is 
primitive and labour intensive. Provision of family planning services is also poor, especially 
in rural areas, and by 2000 the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) in rural Ethiopia was 
only six percent, whereas it was around 45 percent in urban areas
5. The political history of 
Ethiopia has obviously hindered progress in health provision and promoting economic 
reforms. After the traditional monarchy was replaced in 1974 by the provisional military 
government, much of the Ethiopian economy was nationalised. The 1980s followed with 
political unrest and upheavals, and the country was plagued by a series of famines, all with 
devastating effects (Lindstrom and Berhanu, 1999). 
The fertility rates during this period, as depicted in Figure 1, remained high. The 
pattern is in stark contrast to the other countries, all of which have experienced the 
demographic transition, here highlighted by dramatically declining fertility levels. At the 
same time they have experienced impressive rates of economic growth and development. 
Table 1 shows other interesting factors that are correlated both with fertility levels and 
economic development. One issue concerns child labour which has steadily declined in 
Vietnam and Indonesia and is now close to non-existent in Albania. But it is still high in 
Ethiopia and remains critically important in a heavily agricultural based economy (Admassie, 
2002). Moreover, school enrolment and literacy rates, especially in rural areas, are extremely 
low in Ethiopia, whereas they have been on the increase in the other countries.  
Though these simple statistics suggest that as countries progress in their economic 
development, fertility rates also tends to decline, this is not generally the case. An important 
issue concerns urban/rural differentials. Periods of strong economic growth is often followed 
by a decline in the rural population due to migration (Table 1). In Indonesia the rural to urban 
migration is particularly noticeable and reflects important structural changes of the economy 
including reduced dependency of rural economic activities. At the same time the migration 
  8has made access to family planning easier. Consequently poverty and fertility has also 
declined, whereas participation in education has increased. The agricultural sector has also 
seen significant reforms, most importantly in terms of private ownership, which currently 
stands at over 90%. Poverty in rural areas is only marginally higher than in urban areas, and 
there is little difference between urban and rural fertility levels.  
In contrast Ethiopia has experienced only a very modest growth in GDP and rural to 
urban migration has been less pronounced. There have been few economic reforms in the 
Ethiopian agricultural sector, and the current system is still characterised by state control, 
with very limited private ownership. Moreover, land tenure arrangements are a highly 
contentious issue in the Ethiopian agricultural sector, and there is a high level of uncertainty 
associated with future land redistribution. Such uncertainties may cause disincentives for 
farmers’ own investment in enhancing farm productivity. It is also possible that future land 
distribution will depend directly on family size, and in so far this is a common consensus 
among agricultural households, this increases the incentives for childbearing. Though there is 
little difference between poverty in rural and urban areas (it is high everywhere), there is a 
dramatic difference in fertility levels. The TFR in urban areas is around 3.4, whereas in 
Addis Ababa, by far the largest urban concentration in Ethiopia, the TFR is as low as 1.9, 
which is below replacement level. In rural areas, in contrast, the TFR is as high as 6.5 (Kinfu, 
2000; Sibanda et al 2003).  
Vietnam was one of the worlds’ poorest countries in the beginning of the 1980s, but 
has since the beginning of the nineties experienced strong economic growth followed by 
substantially reduced poverty (Glewwe et. al. 2001). Much of this improvement has been 
attributed to the “Doi Moi” policy
6. This was initiated in the late 1980s and roughly 
coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union, on which Vietnam had been heavily 
dependent. The main elements of Doi Moi were replacement of collective farms by allocation 
  9of land to individual households, legalisation of many forms of private economic activity; 
removal of price controls, and legalisation and encouragement of Foreign Development 
Investment (FDI). Substantial progress has been achieved, reducing poverty rates from 
around 56 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 1997, reaching a level around 29 percent in 2004. 
Despite this substantial reduction, there are still significant differences between urban and 
rural areas, both in terms of fertility and poverty.  
Albania is somewhat different in our analysis, given its rather modest population of 3.4 
million in 2001 and close proximity to Europe. However, it shares many similarities in 
demographic and economic development as Vietnam and Indonesia. The country has 
experienced rapid political, social and economic changes since 1992, when democracy was 
re-installed. Between 1993 and 1996 GDP grew by about 9 percent annually, followed by 
slightly lower growth thereafter, though the growth has been sustained. There has also been 
important structural adjustment following the collapse of the communist regime, involving 
banking, land market, and privatization of strategic sectors like telecommunications but also 
of small and medium enterprises. Nevertheless Albania is by far the poorest country in 
Europe and is ranked only 65th of 177 countries by the human development indicator of 
2002 (Human Development Report 2003). Figure 1 indicates the decline in fertility which 
stood at 2.2 in 2003 (Human Development Report 2003 on data of 2002), whereas the high 
life expectancy at birth (currently 74 years) is comparable with European countries. An 
important feature of Albania is the very high level of emigration. Since 1990 about one fifth 
of the total population has left the country and is living abroad mainly in Italy or Greece. As 
a result remittances are estimated to account for about 13 percent of total income among 
Albanian households (INSTAT, 2002).  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
IV.  DATA 
Longitudinal surveys for less developed countries are still rare and certainly less 
extensive than typical panel studies from developed countries. A particular challenge in the 
study of fertility and poverty from a longitudinal perspective is that the surveys do need 
adequate information on both. Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) normally contain 
extremely good information on fertility histories but little information to assess poverty. For 
expenditure surveys, the problem is the opposite, in that demographic information is often 
limited. The surveys selected for our studies contain information on both aspects. For 
Albania and Vietnam we use available Living Standard Measurement Surveys, for Ethiopia 
we use the Ethiopia Urban Household Survey and the Rural Household Survey, and for 
Indonesia we use the Indonesian Family Life Survey. Appendix II gives an overview of the 
surveys. Our analysis is based on two waves, omitting surveys conducted in urban Ethiopia 
in 2000, rural Ethiopia in 1999, and third wave surveyed in Indonesia in 2000. Ethiopia was 
at war with neighbouring Eritrea from 1998 – 2000 and Indonesia was rocked by the East-
Asian financial crisis in mid 1997 (after the field work of the second wave). Both events 
represent important shocks to the economies, and as a result we did not include these waves.  
 
Poverty measurement 
Since we are primarily interested in analysing fertility and household welfare for 
households with subsistence level of income, we compare poor households with non-poor 
households rather than treat expenditure as a continuous variable. Poverty status is specified 
  11as a discrete state, and is derived from the more general FGT family of poverty measures 
(Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984). Let ν be the number of household members, y be the 
household’s welfare indicator (per capita consumption) and let τ be the poverty line. In 
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and  α  ≥ 0 is the coefficient of poverty aversion. For simplicity we focus here on the 
headcount which is given by α = 0. 
The distribution of consumption expenditure within the household is unlikely to be 
uniform across household members, and children tend to consume less than adults. The 
standard solution is to impose an assumption on intra-household resources allocation, and 
adjustment is done by applying an equivalence scale that is consistent with the assumption 
made – producing a measure of expenditure per adult equivalent. Unfortunately, there is 
limited consensus on the appropriate choice of equivalence scales, which are partly due to 
different patterns of household allocation between countries, regions and cultures. As a result 
official poverty statistics are frequently based on per capita household income or 
expenditure, which in effect means that in terms of household allocation, each household 
member is given equal weight. An implication of this approach is that households with a 
large number of dependent children are more likely to be recorded as being poor. In the 
present paper we maintain consistency with official poverty statistics, and define poverty 
  12over per capita consumption expenditure
7. Clearly this assumption needs to be taken into 
account in interpreting the estimates. 
  The poverty line τ is constructed using the ‘cost of basic needs’ approach following 
Ravallion and Bidani (1994). In brief this involves estimating the cost of a certain 
expenditure level which corresponds to a minimum calorie requirement. A food poverty 
threshold is defined as the expenditure needed to purchase a basket of goods that will give 
the required minimum calorie intake. Following FAO recommendations this threshold is set 
2288 calories for Albania, and 2100 calories for the other three countries
8.  
 
V.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Given the interaction between fertility and poverty, we first examine the effect of poverty 
on fertility and second the effect of fertility on poverty. We do so by analysing both static 
and dynamic perspectives. Our econometric strategy consists of first estimating a poisson
9 
model of children and a probit regression of poverty, respectively, in the initial wave. These 
regressions provide a snapshot or a cross sectional view of the pattern of poverty and fertility 
for the four countries. We then implement dynamic models by estimating a poisson 
regression of the number of newborn children
10 recorded between waves. In contrast to the 
cross sectional regression this informs us about how the rate of childbearing differs by 
background characteristics. Finally we estimate the rates of poverty entry and exit. In order 
to avoid endogeneity issues, we control for background variables that are recorded in the 
initial wave only. Throughout we take the household as the unit of analysis, implying that 
fertility decisions are implicitly assumed to be made at the household level, and as a result 
we concentrate on the characteristics of the household and the household head in explaining 
poverty and fertility patterns. The approach has a direct impact on the way the dependent 
variable is defined in the econometric framework detailed in section 5 below. For the static 
  13analysis this is taken to be the number of children living in the household. Thus it does not 
capture the number of children that might have died or left the household. For the dynamic 
analysis, the dependent variable is defined as the number of births occurring between the two 
waves. 
Of interest for us is to capture the impact of those variables which reflects the 
resources, or lack thereof, available to the household. The educational attainment of the 
household head is here defined by four groups, the lowest (the reference group) referring to 
no education and the highest refers to college/university education. Whereas the educational 
level of the household head is likely to reflect an income effect, and therefore be positively 
associated with fertility, the effect of education of other household members is less clear. A 
high educational level of the spouse will reflect higher opportunity costs whereas high 
education among children reflects a preference for parent’s investment in child quality. 
Education of the household members (other than the household head) is implemented by 
counting the number of individuals who had more than compulsory education, the number 
having  just compulsory education, and the number of individuals having less than the 
compulsory level. We also make control for the profession of the household head, which is 
likely to be related to household income, marital status, the number of generations living in 
the household, regions, religion, and ethnicity. Note however, that the professional codes 
differ somewhat in the different surveys. Appendix I provides the details of these codes.  
 
Fertility: the static perspective  
The cross sectional regression is useful in assessing to what extent the 
poverty/fertility association in the four countries analysed here is consistent with the existing 
literature. The regression results presented in Table 2 show no surprises. First we find that in 
all four countries household defined as poor are associated with a higher level of fertility. To 
  14a large extent this is a result of our definition poverty which is based on per capita household 
expenditure. Thus the more children, the lower is the per capita expenditure, and the higher is 
the likelihood of experiencing poverty. The correlation is strongest for Vietnam both in terms 
of both magnitude and significance. Educational level of the household head shows a general 
positive association with fertility, though the effects are not always significant (e.g. Ethiopia) 
and they are not always monotonic: in Vietnam those with medium level education has 
higher fertility than those with very high education. Accumulated human capital of remaining 
household members shows a negative relationship with fertility, which is what we would 
expect.  But again the effects are not always significant (e.g. Ethiopia). The controls for 
activity and occupational status of the household head also show some significant effects 
with respect to overall fertility (the reference group are those out of the labour force, single 
mothers, disabled or casual workers), though the effects vary from country to country. 
Another consistent result is that farm households tend to have higher fertility, though 
Indonesia is here an exception.  
  15INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Childbearing: the dynamic perspective 
Next we estimate the Poisson regression
11 of number of newly born children between 
two waves using household observable characteristics in the first wave as explanatory 
variables. In contrast to the static perspective, this regression reflects differences in the 
childbearing intensity. The results, presented in Table 3, tell us a different story from that in 
the static framework. At a conventional level of significance, poor households in the first 
wave do not have more newborn children between two waves than non-poor households in 
each of four countries. The effect is particularly weak for the Ethiopian sample, and suggests 
that poor and non-poor households tend to have similar spacing between birth events. The 
fact that wealthier households have fewer children in general, which is clear from the static 
analysis, means that childbearing careers for these women are on average shorter. Hotz et al 
(1997) argue that in the absence of credit markets, households with a steeper income profile 
have an incentive to space birth more widely. According to this argument, our estimates 
suggest that the slopes of the income profiles for non-poor and poor households are similar
12. 
But a more plausible explanation concerns fertility control in that non-poor households have 
better access to modern contraceptives than poor households, and this may explain the 
similarity of birth hazards between poor and non-poor households. Although this hypothesis 
needs more scrutiny in looking at the level of family planning program and pattern of 
breastfeeding in four countries, the results in Table 3 together with those in static framework 
suggest that poor households give births over a longer period of time, supporting the 
hypothesis that poor households tend to have more children due to imperfect birth control in 
the four countries under our study. 
 
  16INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Though poverty status itself has little impact on the birth hazard, other variables 
which certainly reflect the resource level of the household do. We consider first the work 
ratios for men and women in Ethiopia. A high work ratio among men reflects an income 
effect, and should be positively associated with childbearing. For women, a high work ratio 
also reflects a higher opportunity cost of having children, and the negative impact (though 
not significant) found for Ethiopia is consistent with this view. Households where the head 
has very high educational level have a higher intensity of having children, whereas a high 
number of household members with post compulsory education tend to have fewer children. 
The latter suggests that households with high levels of human capital have a lower birth 
hazard, whereas the high education among household heads represents an income effect, and 
therefore increasing the birth hazard. Though the proportion of highly educated individuals is 
in general low in Ethiopia
13, which might in part drive the positive estimate for high 
education among household heads, these findings do suggest that improving education and 
employment opportunities for women is a route to control fertility. Though the activity status 
of the household head is also important, the main interest lies in farm households which have 
one of the highest propensities of having children. This is of course consistent with the high 
TFR in rural Ethiopia.  
To what extent are these estimates different in the other countries? For Indonesia the 
stock of children shows a similar pattern to that of Ethiopia. The effect of the work ratio of 
household members is however different. In Indonesia, a high male work ratio is positively 
associated with childbearing, which reflects an income effect, insignificant female work 
ratio, but a strong negative impact of the child work ratio. This latter effect, which is not 
actually significant for Ethiopia, is more complicated to explain. There are two important 
  17effects at work here. First, if the level of investment in human capital of existing children 
reflects the investment in all children, working children imply a lower investment on 
children, and thereby a lower cost of having another child
14. On the other hand, households 
with a large number of the children working, reflects a higher cost of having further children 
in that older children may be less available for the caring of younger children. Farm 
households in Indonesia do not have a higher rate of childbearing compared to the other 
household types, which is stark contrast to Ethiopia, but consistent with the overall TFR in 
Indonesia: Indonesian farm households do not have a TFR much higher than urban 
households. As for education variables we find similarities with Ethiopia in that only those 
households with very high levels are less likely to have children. In contrast, there is little 
impact of the human capital accumulation of remaining household members.  
Moving onto Albania and Vietnam we find poverty status to have more of a positive 
impact on fertility, though only for Albania is the estimate found to be strong and significant 
(at the 10 percent level). For Albania the regression is somewhat poorly defined, which is 
partly due to the short interval between the waves (here only two years), and the sample size 
is 1503 households, which limits the number of recorded birth events. The only other 
variables which have a significant impact are the age of the household head, the number of 
children aged between 10 and 14, which has a negative impact, and the strong positive effect 
associated with the work ratio of men. Vietnam resembles Indonesia in many respects. This 
includes the stock and age of the children present in the household, the education variables, 
and also the work ratio variables. Overall these variables have more explanatory power in the 
Vietnam sample. As for education we find these variables to have a strong impact in 
Vietnam. Both educational level of the household head and the remaining family members 
are associated with lower birth intensity. We also see that Vietnamese farm households have 
  18a higher rate of childbearing, though the magnitude of the effects is considerably lower than 
for Ethiopia.  
 
Poverty: the static perspective 
The results of the probit estimates of poverty status in the initial wave are given in Table 4. 
Similar to the cross sectional regression of fertility, we find clear positive correlations 
between number of children and poverty incidents in all four countries, and the age 
distribution of children matters. In Albania, Indonesia, and Vietnam, the number of young 
children (age 0-4) is associated with higher poverty incidents, and the correlation becomes 
monotonically smaller for older children (age 5-9, age10-14). In association is positive in 
Ethiopia as well, though here the effects are not monotonic with respect to the children’s age. 
High work ratio of adults tends to give lower likelihood of poverty, though Vietnam 
represents here an exception in that these ratios have a positive sign (though not significant). 
A possible explanation for this is the very high rates of work participation in Vietnam, close 
to 90 percent for both men and women. The raw data shows that the few households with low 
work ratios actually have lower poverty, implying that household members (normally of 
higher age) do not work only if they can afford to. For Ethiopia the child work ratio is 
negatively associated with poverty (though not significant at the 5% level). Given that 40 
percent of children in Ethiopia are recorded as working (see Table 1), this indicates that child 
labour is indeed an important economic resource for the households and is likely to be 
important in preventing poverty. Of course, child labour may very well have a negative sign 
with respect to poverty, which would be the case if households are forced to make their 
children work if they face extreme poverty. This seems to be the case for Indonesia, where 
the coefficient is positive and significant. During the nineties child labour declined in 
  19Indonesia (down to less three percent) suggesting that children tend to work only when the 
household face extreme poverty. 
 
  INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
High education is associated with a lower probability of being poor, and in most cases 
there is monotonic gradient: the higher the level, the lower the poverty. The only discrepancy 
to this pattern is in Ethiopia, where we find those with medium level education not to have 
lower poverty rate than those without any education. As for the human capital accumulation 
of remaining household members, we also find a negative association. In particular, high 
proportions of individuals with post-compulsory education are strongly associated with lower 
poverty.  
Though activity and occupational status are important, we focus here on the effect of 
farm households. For Vietnam and Albania we find that farmers are significantly poorer than 
the other categories (most of which will be households located in urban areas). The effect is 
particularly pronounced in Vietnam. In Indonesia there are no differential effects for farm 
households. A possible explanation for this is that the great majority of farm households in 
Indonesia hold a higher share of ownership (average household share of ownership is 90%.), 
and over the last two decades farming in Indonesia has seen steady reforms that has increased 
productivity and efficiency. Though the raw data indicates that poverty is slightly higher 
among farmers (20%) than non-farmers (17%), other regressions (not shown here) also 
indicate that poor farmers tend to be less educated and are geographically concentrated. 
Thus, net of education and regional dummies, we cannot find that farmers are poorer than 
non-farmers.  
  20More interesting is perhaps the negative (though not significant) effect for farm 
households in Ethiopia. This might at first seem surprising, but it is important to bear in mind 
that the reference group includes casual workers, female headed household, and those out of 
the labour force, or disabled. A large part of those households in the reference group are 
located in urban areas, where we know poverty is almost as high as in rural areas. Comparing 
farm households with those of the other activity statuses, we do find that they tend to be 
poorer.  
 
Poverty: the dynamic perspective 
Table 5 presents the results from our poverty dynamics regression. These are 
essentially the hazard rates of either entering or exiting poverty, and are implemented by 
estimating simple probit models of the two rates. The entry model has dependent variable 
equal to 1 if the household makes a transition into poverty, and is estimated from the sub-
sample of households who are initially not in poverty in the first wave. The dependent 
variable in the exit model is equal to 1 if the household moves out of poverty, and is 
estimated from the sample of households who are initially classified as poor.  A critical 
variable in these models is the household’s proportionate distance from the poverty line at the 
initial wave, defined as |y0-τ|/τ. Including this variable adjust for the fact that households 
located close to the poverty line in the base year are more likely to make a poverty transition.  
Consistent across countries, bar Albania where the estimates are less significant, 
households with young children are more likely to enter poverty and less likely to exit. Given 
that young children are normally classified as dependants, this is what we would expect. 
However, the estimates become more mixed when we consider the older children, and 
curiously for Ethiopia – children in the age group 4 – 9 do not have much impact on changes 
in poverty, whereas households with more grown up children (10 to 14) are more likely to  
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experience poverty. Interestingly a similar pattern seems evident for Albania, where 
households with many older children have significantly lower exit rates. A possible 
explanation is that many of these older children are in the school leaving age and therefore 
entering the labour market. Unemployment is high both in Albania and Ethiopia (especially 
in urban areas) and youth wages are in any case very low. Unemployment is lower both in 
Vietnam and Indonesia.  
We consider next the work ratios of men, women and children, all of which 
representing measures of the extent household members contribute to the overall level of 
resources in the household. The estimates for Vietnam show that a high male work ratio does 
not always reflect lower poverty. We would of course expect the opposite effects in so far an 
increase in the ratio of working men implies an increase in the disposable household income. 
A simple tabulation of poverty rates for households with different numbers of working men 
(not shown here) reveals indeed that households with one or more non-working  male 
household members have lower poverty. These households are characterised by a higher age 
of the household head, and a higher educational attainment. It seems though that in Vietnam, 
male household members might retire from work if they consider that the household can 
afford such an arrangement.  
We also find interesting results for the child work ratios. In Ethiopia child labour 
significantly reduces poverty entry as well as increasing the exit rate. Given that the rate of 
child labour in Ethiopia is around 40 percent, it is clear that this is an important contribution 
to the household resources, and thereby reducing the likelihood of poverty. There are similar 
effects for Vietnam, though the magnitude of the estimates is more modest. In Indonesia, the 
estimates are not significant, whereas for Albania child labour is associated with a lower exit 
rate. Child labour in Albania is very low, but the estimate suggests that some household may 
  22encourage child labour as a result of economic hardship, which is reflected by the lower exit 
rates. Overall it seems clear that child labour is an important source of income for Ethiopia 
and Vietnam, but not for Albania and Indonesia. This, in turn, suggests a possibility of 
poverty trap in Ethiopia and Vietnam where poor household tend to have more children, and 
lack of investment on human capital lead to poverty (Moav, 2005). 
Education and human capital accumulation of household members are important 
predictors for poverty dynamics. In general high educational level of the household head is 
associated with lower transition into poverty, but if entering poverty, they have a higher exit 
rate. The same relationship is evident when considering the number of household members 
with post compulsory and compulsory education: the higher the number the lower is the 
transition rate into poverty and the higher is the exit rate. The education variables are 
particularly important for Indonesia and Vietnam, whereas they appear less important for 
Ethiopia.  
As for farm households we find rather differing results across countries. Interestingly 
we find that farm households in Ethiopia are more likely to exit poverty compared to many of 
the other categories work categories (i.e. activity status1 to 6). This is explained by the fact 
that poverty in rural Ethiopia fell between 1994 and 1997
15, whereas in urban areas the 
poverty rates increased slightly. Though poverty fell sharply in Vietnam from 1993 to 1997, 
it did so in a disproportionate fashion by benefiting urban areas more than rural areas. These 
patterns are reflected in the poverty transition regression, where we see that farm household 
have a higher entry and lower exit rate. In Indonesia, in contrast, there is no significant 
difference in poverty transitions for farm households compared to other groups. 
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VI.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The existence of longitudinal information at household level for these countries 
facilitates highly interesting case studies, in which poverty dynamics can be studied in 
conjunction with demographic changes at the household level. The great majority of past 
studies have considered poverty from a static perspective. Studies concerned with the 
dynamic side of poverty are few, and none of these have explicitly considered the link with 
fertility behaviour. Our analysis shows that the relationship between fertility and poverty is a 
complex one and certainly not uniform across countries. The four countries included in this 
study vary greatly in terms of the demographic and economic transition.  Ethiopia is by far 
the poorest country and has still low economic growth and a persistent degree of poverty. 
Indonesia and Vietnam have made great strides in boosting economic activity and thereby 
reducing poverty. At the same time these countries have experienced sharp declines in 
fertility rates. Though economic growth undoubtedly had an important contributing factor to 
this fertility decline, it is also the case that during the same period these countries have 
experienced great improvements in access to family planning. It is useful at this point to 
summarise what we can infer from our estimation results.  
For Ethiopia most of the results are consistent with economic development theory. 
The number of children, both very young ones and older ones, is positively associated with 
poverty. However, an important finding is that the number of working children plays an 
important role in alleviating poverty. Interestingly, the dynamic analysis of fertility showed 
that poor households in Ethiopia do not have a higher birth hazard than non-poor households. 
Rather, the birth hazard seems to be driven by human capital variables, and occupation – in 
particular whether the household was in the agriculture sector or not. As such, high fertility 
in Ethiopia is largely a phenomenon related to rural communities, which constitutes around 
  2485 percent of the population. There are two important characterising factors of the agriculture 
sector: 1) farming technology is highly primitive and therefore labour intensive, and 2) 
access to family planning is extremely poor
16. Both are crucial factors in maintaining the 
high fertility rate, and several studies have reported that the problem of unmet need is 
substantial in rural Ethiopia. However, given the central role of child labour in reducing 
poverty, it is clear that there are also important demand side incentives in place. Overall, our 
analysis shows that both improved labour market and educational opportunities and 
improvements in family planning – preferably both – should have a substantial impact on 
reducing poverty in Ethiopia.  
From being a very poor country back in the seventies and the early eighties, Indonesia 
has seen tremendous economic growth, followed by important structural changes of the 
economy, which is reflected by the massive rural/urban migration – reducing the numbers of 
households being involved in labour intensive farming and giving farmers private ownership. 
School enrolment has been steadily increasing, child labour declining, and family planning 
substantially improved. These changes have obvious implications for the role of children and 
parents’ fertility choices, and are reflected in our analysis. In contrast to Ethiopia we found 
that farm households do not have more children than non-farm households and that child 
labour is positively related to poverty, suggesting that only very poor households use child 
labour a “last resort” to cope with financial distress. As a result, there is little to suggest from 
our results that Indonesian households choose to have a high quantity of children as a means 
to boost household resources, and thereby reducing poverty risk. If anything, the trend seems 
to be the opposite. 
 Many of the features relevant for Indonesia are also present for Albania, whereas 
Vietnam is at a stage between Indonesia and Ethiopia. Though economic growth has also 
been strong in Vietnam over recent years, it is clear the country lags behind Indonesia 
  25significantly, and there is not a similar level of urban migration, implying a continued 
importance of the agricultural sector. Though there is still a significant difference between 
farmers and non-farmers in terms of poverty, it is also clear that farm households benefited 
significantly from the economic progress. Is this the main cause behind the fertility decline? 
On the basis of our analysis of Indonesia, Vietnam and Albania one might be tempted to 
make such a conclusion. However, one important distinguishing feature of these countries 
compared to Ethiopia, is that family planning programs were initiated already back in the 
1960s, and this may explain why the fertility decline started before these countries faced 
significant economic improvements (See Figure 1). At present day family planning and 
school enrolment in these countries are quite extensive, both of which undoubtedly is playing 
important role both in terms of limiting fertility and helping economic growth.  
Though our analysis reveals that the poverty/fertility relationships tend to be 
complex, it is also the case that there are certain important commonalities. Perhaps the most 
important one is the role of human capital. In particular we find that the educational level of 
the household head is almost always negatively associated with poverty. Often, though not 
always, do we find accumulation of educational levels of other household members to have a 
similar effect. But there are differences in magnitude, and we find that education has the 
lowest impact on fertility and poverty in Ethiopia. This is due to either low return to 
education, or, due to the fact that the majority has very low education – rendering the 
educational variables to distinguish differences in poverty and fertility. As already 
mentioned, the pattern in Ethiopia is consistent with poor availability of family planning. We 
also find that presence of young children is associated with higher poverty rates, which is the 
case for all countries.  
Based on the insight of Indonesia, Vietnam, and Albania – to what extent can we 
expect poverty and fertility decline in Ethiopia? In order to see similar developments several 
  26elements of Ethiopian society needs to be addressed. Key fundamentals concern of course 
educational infra structure and family planning – both of which are established, or at least 
well in progress, in the other three countries. Together with recent market reforms and 
improving land tenure rights, Indonesia, Vietnam and Albania seems to have had the 
appropriate foundations for reducing poverty and fertility. A similar replication in Ethiopia 
will take time and effort, and will certainly require long term commitments in more than one 
area of societal developments.  
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  31Table 1: Demographic and economic indicators    
    1980 1990 2000 2003 
Albania  3.6 3.0 2.4  2.2* 
Ethiopia  6.6 6.9 5.7  5.7* 
Indonesia 4.3 3.0 2.5  2.3* 
Total Fertility Rate 
Vietnam  5.0 3.6 2.5  1.9* 
Albania  69.3 72.3 74.0  73.99* 
Ethiopia  42.0 45.0 42.3  42.1* 
Indonesia 54.8 61.7 66.0  66.7* 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Vietnam  60.1 64.8 69.0  69.7* 
Albania  2.0 1.2 0.4 0.6 
Ethiopia  2.7 3.7 2.4 2.1 
Indonesia 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Population growth (% annual) 
Vietnam  2.1 2.2 1.3 1.1 
Albania  2.7 3.3 3.1 3.2 
Ethiopia  37.7 51.2 64.4 68.6 
Indonesia 148.3 178.2 206.3 214.5 
Total population (mill.) 
Vietnam  53.7 66.2 78.5 81.3 
Albania  66.3 63.9 58.1 56.2 
Ethiopia  89.5 87.3 85.1 84.4 
Indonesia 77.9 69.4 58.0 54.5 
Rural population (% of total) 
Vietnam  80.6 79.7 75.7 74.2 
Albania  910.0  841.9 1008.0 1190.4 
Ethiopia  .. 107.3 115.1 115.0 
Indonesia 503.0 776.7  1014.6  1089.8 
GDP per capita ($US 1995 
prices) 
Vietnam  .. 211.2 369.5 437.9 
Albania  3.6 1.9 0.3 0.2 
Ethiopia  46.3 43.5 41.1 40.4 
Indonesia 13.5 11.3  7.8  6.8 
Child labour (% of 10-14 age 
group) 
Vietnam 21.8  13.0 5.2 2.6 
*Data refer to 2002, last year available  (Source: World Development Indicators database) 
 
  32Table 2: Poisson regression of number of children in first wave  







         
   Albania  Ethiopia  Indonesia  Vietnam 
Poverty status  0.155  0.246  0.247 0.331 
   (2.65)  (7.72)  (7.63) (11.33) 
Age of HH head  0.348  0.206  0.26 0.307 
 (12.24)  (18.34)  (24.91) (29.20) 
Age of HH head squared  -0.005  -0.002  -0.003 -0.004 
   (-13.94)  (-19.09)  (-26.87) (-31.32) 
# adults  -0.134  -0.024  -0.086  -0.008 
   (-2.88)  (-1.83)  (-4.43)  (-0.47) 
HHH low education  -0.042  0.043  0.096  0.126 
 (-0.2)  (1.02)  (2.54)  (2.10) 
HHH medium education  0.253  0.015  0.074  0.204 
 (1.15)  (0.29)  (1.42)  (3.47) 
HHH high education  0.228  -0.067  0.034  0.105 
 (0.94)  (-1.01)  (0.61)  (1.47) 
#post compulsory ed.  -0.252  -0.023  -0.025  -0.078 
 (-4.39)  (-1.40)  (-1.19)  (-4.74) 
#compulsory ed.  0.005  0.018  -0.021  -0.025 
   (0.1)  (0.56)  (-0.88)  (-1.05) 
HH head married  1.182  0.727  1.111  1.048 
 (6.32)  (15.16)  (15.76)  (17.90) 
# generations  0.297  0.209  0.327  0.086 
   (4.0)  (6.23)  (10.65) (2.57) 
Activity status 1  0.198  0.099  -0.263 -0.020 
 (1.27)  (1.88)  (-1.99) (-0.29) 
Activity status 2  0.134  0.474  0.073 -0.098 
 (0.81)  (2.77)  (1.49) (-0.95) 
Activity status 3  0.16  0.251  0.091 -0.241 
 (0.92)  (3.92)  (1.73) (-1.33) 
Activity status 4  0.256  -0.071  0.037 0.006 
 (0.89)  (-1.13)  (0.82) (0.11) 
Activity status 5  0.066  0.246  -0.033 -0.153 
 (0.6)  (2.71)  (-1.05) (-1.64) 
Activity status 6  0.177  0.088  -  0.104 
 (2.25)  (0.75)  -  (1.87) 
Farm household  0.138  0.146  -0.279 0.151 
   (1.9)  (2.58)  (-1.41) (4.44) 
Constant -7.461  -4.778  -5.716 -6.570 
   (-10.72)  (-17.33)  (-24.23) (-26.39) 
Observations 1503       2251  4497 4020 
Regression includes control for ethnicity, religion and region.  
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(t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
   Albania  Ethiopia  Indonesia  Vietnam 
Poverty status in wave 1  0.581  -0.013  -0.122  0.117 
   (1.8)  (-0.14)  (-1.62)  (1.50) 
Age of HH head  -0.148  -0.043  -0.027  -0.055 
   (-7.18)  (-8.59)  (-9.73)  (-14.34) 
#children 0 - 4  -0.035  0.329  0.116  0.071 
  (-0.16) (5.98) (2.67) (1.50) 
#children 5 - 9  0.036  0.079  -0.019  -0.191 
 (0.17)  (1.63)  (-0.47)  (-4.52) 
#children 10 - 14  -0.637  -0.042  -0.192  -0.219 
  (-2.01) (-0.69) (-4.86) (-3.91) 
Other  children  -0.044 0.025 0.047 0.113 
    (-0.06) (0.37) (1.00) (1.77) 
# adults  -0.003  0.034  0.052  -0.053 
 (-0.01)  (0.84)  (1.32)  (-1.12) 
Male work ratio  0.909  0.008  0.377  0.776 
  (2.02) (0.04) (3.77) (5.14) 
Female work ratio  0.006  -0.309  -0.018  0.007 
 (0.02)  (-1.55)  (-0.27)  (0.06) 
Child  work  ratio  -1.646 -0.103 -0.699 -0.908 
    (-0.89) (-0.55) (-1.91) (-4.48) 
HHH low education  0.431  -0.138  -0.007  -0.080 
  (0.4) (-1.17) (-0.09) (-0.62) 
HHH medium education  0.398  0.138  -0.107  -0.296 
 (0.35)  (0.91)  (-0.99)  (-2.25) 
HHH high education  1.26  0.417  -0.184  -0.280 
 (1.0)  (1.95)  (-1.62)  (-1.67) 
#post compulsory ed.  -0.202  -0.289  0.051  -0.146 
  (-0.55) (-4.02)  (1.22) (-3.02) 
#compulsory ed.  0.013  0.010  0.034  -0.007 
   (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.70)  (-0.10) 
HHH  married  1.077 0.509 -0.007 0.074 
  (1.02) (3.03) (-0.07) (0.58) 
# generations  -0.256  0.081  0.168  -0.082 
   (-0.67)  (0.78)  (2.65)  (-0.94) 
Activity status 1  -0.142  -0.089  0.008  0.343 
 (-0.16)  (-0.54)  (0.04)  (2.11) 
Activity  status  2  -0.171 1.034 -0.392 0.121 
  (-0.21) (1.66) (-3.31) (0.39) 
Activity status 3  -0.598  0.247  -0.271  -0.216 
 (-0.53)  (0.85)  (-2.15)  (-0.43) 
Activity status 4  -13.138  0.093  -0.35  -0.160 
 (-0.01)  (0.35)  (-3.06)  (-0.91) 
Activity  status  5  0.009 0.609 0.021 0.040 
  (0.02) (1.71) (0.30) (0.16) 
Activity  status  6  0.063 0.711  - 0.020 
  (0.15) (2.39)  - (0.13) 
Farm  household  -0.428 0.698 -0.304 0.171 
    (-0.94) (3.78) (-1.02) (1.88) 
Constant -11.365  -1.134  -0.22  0.815 
   (-0.02)  (-2.22)  (-0.97)  (2.14) 
Observations  1503 2251 4497 4020 
Regression includes control for ethnicity, religion and region. 
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(t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
    Albania Ethiopia Indonesia Vietnam 
Age of HH head  -0.02  0.001  0.005  -0.005 
   (-4.54)  (0.34)  (2.53)  (2.31) 
#children 0 - 4  0.336  0.154  0.323  0.523 
 (3.93)  (3.53)  (8.05)  (12.16) 
#children 5 - 9  0.288  0.096  0.122  0.344 
 (4.20)  (2.76)  (3.34)  (10.53) 
#children 10 - 14  0.109  0.189  0.053  0.133 
 (1.85)  (5.38)  (1.65)  (4.09) 
#children 15 plus  -0.021  0.097  0.061  0.046 
 (-0.39)  (3.19)  (1.52)  (1.20) 
Other children  0.163  0.103  0.092  0.251 
 (2.49)  (2.76)  (2.32)  (6.35) 
# adults  0.16  -0.016  0.175  0.136 
   (2.52)  (-0.55)  (4.60)  (3.47) 
Male work ratio  -0.238  -0.190  -0.095  0.065 
 (-2.14)  (-2.16)  (-1.21)  (0.92) 
Female work ratio  -0.369  -0.120  -0.06  0.116 
 (-3.69)  (-1.23)  (-1.07)  (1.47) 
Child work ratio  0.221  -0.157  0.416  0.141 
   (1.01)  (-1.42)  (2.06)  (1.54) 
HHH low education  -0.244  -0.130  -0.125  -0.331 
 (-1.62)  (-1.70)  (-2.09)  (-3.98) 
HHH medium education  -0.424  -0.073  -0.177  -0.383 
 (-2.30)  (-0.75)  (-1.99)  (-4.42) 
HHH high education  -0.539  -0.512  -0.338  -0.835 
 (-2.32)  (-4.50)  (-3.24)  (-7.37) 
#post compulsory ed.  0.085  -0.118  -0.237  -0.224 
 (1.39)  (-4.06)  (-6.39)  (-8.00) 
#compulsory ed.  0.089  0.024  -0.081  -0.105 
   (1.68)  (0.40)  (-1.95)  (-2.51) 
HH head married   -0.085  -0.001  -0.215  -0.197 
 (-0.66)  (-0.01)  (-2.67)  (-2.70) 
# generations  -0.194  0.156  0.019  -0.068 
   (-2.12)  (2.57)  (0.35)  (-1.20) 
Activity status 1  -0.576  0.168  -0.223  -0.330 
 (-1.90)  (1.68)  (-1.55)  (-2.48) 
Activity status 2  -0.154  -1.699  -0.251  -0.391 
 (-0.64)  (-3.94)  (-2.67)  (-1.94) 
Activity status 3  -0.55  -0.545  -0.352  -0.071 
 (-1.60)  (4.61)  (-3.41)  (-0.24) 
Activity status 4  -  -0.398  -0.055  -0.341 
 -  (-3.53)  (-0.59)  (-3.26) 
Activity status 5  -0.187  -0.246  0.25  -0.460 
 (-1.10)  (-1.35)  (4.28)  (-3.00) 
Activity status 6  -0.699  -0.200  -  -0.198 
 (-5.03)  (-1.02)  -  (-1.85) 
Farm household  0.418  -0.154  0.01  0.547 
   (3.62)  (-1.57)  (0.04)  (9.78) 
Constant 0.434  -0.773  -1.26  0.651 
   (0.93)  (-3.15)  (-6.07)  (2.46) 
Observations 1676  2459  4797  4302 
Regression includes control for ethnicity, religion and region 
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(t-statistics in parenthesis) 
   Albania  Ethiopia  Indonesia  Vietnam 
  Enter Exit  Enter Exit  Enter Exit  Enter Exit 
Age of HH head  -0.014  -0.016  0.002 -0.002  0.005 -0.008 -0.012  0.001 
  (-2.41)  (-1.59) (0.47)  (-0.63) (2.02)  (-1.74)  (-2.90) (0.39) 
#children  0  -  4  0.045 -0.193  0.124 -0.093  0.194 -0.173  0.178 -0.259 
  (0.34) (-1.24)  (1.81) (-1.50)  (3.73) (-2.22)  (1.95) (-5.35) 
#children  5  -  9  0.018 -0.194  0.013 -0.031  0.062 -0.193 -0.189 -0.040 
  (0.17) (-1.6) (0.24)  (-0.62) (1.32)  (-2.71)  (-2.41)  (-1.06) 
#children  10  -  14  0.105 -0.24 0.151  -0.095 -0.05 0.037  -0.126 0.025 
  (1.27)  (-2.06) (2.83)  (-1.90)  (-1.20) (0.59)  (-1.83) (0.60) 
Other  children  -0.02 0.035 0.112  -0.042 0.057  -0.002 0.010  -0.057 
    (-0.2) (0.27) (1.96)  (-0.83) (1.11)  (-0.03) (0.13)  (-1.23) 
#men  0.13 0.012 0.006  -0.053 0.100  -0.057 0.098  -0.083 
  (1.39)  (0.1) (0.14)  (-1.21) (1.99)  (-0.78) (1.48)  (-1.83) 
#women  -0.011 -0.197 -0.094 -0.056  0.063 -0.122  0.139 -0.031 
    (-0.11) (-1.67) (-1.97) (-1.33)  (1.13) (-1.59)  (2.13) (-0.69) 
Male  work  ratio  -0.068 -0.643 -0.111  0.074 -0.245 -0.024  0.315  0.172 
  (-0.44)  (-2.7) (-0.83)  (0.59) (-2.48) (-0.15)  (2.20)  (1.65) 
Female  work  ratio  0.105 -0.189  0.008 -0.211 -0.052  0.107 -0.086 -0.078 
  (0.8) (-0.84)  (0.06) (-1.46) (-0.71)  (0.93) (-0.58) (-0.72) 
Child  work  ratio  -0.259 -0.903 -0.310  0.486  0.038 -0.334 -0.266  0.231 
    (-0.76) (-2.27) (-1.84)  (3.15)  (0.13) (-0.92) (-1.41)  (1.98) 
HHH low education  -0.137  0.144  -0.096  -0.172 -0.100 -0.014 -0.199  0.232 
  (-0.69)  (0.47) (-0.86) (-1.60) (-1.31) (-0.12) (-1.28)  (2.20) 
HHH  medium  edu.  -0.011 0.147 0.176  -0.136  -0.195 0.381  -0.340 0.334 
  (-0.04) (0.38) (1.19)  (-0.98)  (-1.72) (2.11)  (-2.07) (3.05) 
HHH  high  education  -0.29  1.152 -0.456 -0.046 -0.268  0.52 -0.963  0.415 
  (-0.83)  (1.5) (-2.83) (-0.26) (-2.07)  (2.08) (-3.95)  (2.68) 
#post  compulsory  ed.  -0.217 0.086  -0.007 0.025  -0.152 0.083  -0.179 0.235 
  (-2.21) (0.69)  (-0.15) (0.59)  (-3.19) (1.11)  (-3.36) (6.50) 
#compulsory  ed.  0.064 -0.003 -0.101  0.052 -0.028  0.04 -0.071  0.171 
    (0.87) (-0.03) (-1.04)  (0.62) (-0.53)  (0.50) (-0.94)  (3.22) 
HHH  married  -0.424 -0.22  -0.075  -0.289 -0.27  -0.026  -0.031 0.204 
  (-2.46) (-0.74) (-0.68) (-2.50) (-2.76) (-0.15) (-0.23)  (2.11) 
#  generations  -0.004 0.112 0.072 0.055 0.108 0.028  -0.096 0.143 
    (-0.04) (0.51) (0.81) (0.60) (1.57) (0.26)  (-0.90) (1.85) 
Activity  status  1  0.188 - - -  -0.108  0.361  0.141  0.145 
  (0.44) - - -  (-0.61)  (1.09)  (0.54)  (0.71) 
Activity  status  2  0.023  -  -0.363  - 0.148 0.028  -0.202 0.301 
  (0.06)  -  (-1.06)  - (1.23) (0.15)  (-0.53) (0.95) 
Activity  status  3  -0.448  - -0.200  0.322  0.008 -0.097  0.022  - 
  (-0.86)  -  (-1.23) (1.72) (0.06)  (-0.469 (0.04)  - 
Activity  status  4  -0.101  - -0.617  0.060  0.161 -0.002 -0.065  0.234 
  (-0.16)  - (-3.71)  (0.33)  (1.31) (-0.01) (-0.34)  (1.39) 
Activity  status  5  -0.284 1.022 0.087 0.336 0.239 0.063  -0.577 0.428 
  (-1.0) (2.31) (0.34) (1.25) (3.22) (0.53)  (-1.56) (1.31) 
Activity  status  6  -0.331 1.229 0.396 0.893      -0.233 0.122 
  (-1.79) (2.91) (1.49) (3.14)      (-0.93) (0.76) 
Farm  household  0.281  -0.128 0.033 0.495 0.153  0.2 0.522  -0.186 
    (1.82)  (-0.52) (0.23) (3.75) (0.50) (0.42) (4.61) (2.23) 
Distance  to  poverty  line  0.00 -0.005 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002  -0.01  0.000 -0.025 
    (2.02) (-1.78) (-2.95) (-6.72) (-7.85) (-3.72)  (0.36)  (6.34) 
Constant  -0.985  2.75 0.698  -0.585  -1.155 1.788  -0.143 0.994 
    (-1.5)  (2.5) (2.24)  (-1.36)  (-4.389 (4.01) (0.29) (2.53) 
Observations  1286  384 1164 1293 3937  860 1890 2404 
Regression includes control for ethnicity, religion and region. 
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 Albania  Ethiopia  Indonesia  Vietnam 














Activity Status 1  Manager  Employer Housekeeping    Manager 
Activity Status 2  Professional 
(medical & 
life sciences) 
Self employed  Self-employed   Professional 
(medical & life 
sciences) 























Skilled worker  Family worker   Family worker, 
personal 
services, sales. 
Activity Status 6  Skilled 
manual 
worker. 
  Skilled  manual 
worker. 
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APPENDIX II: THE SURVEYS 
 























































Two waves in 
1994, then 
subsequent 
waves in 1995, 
1997 and 1999. 
Three waves: 
Aug 1993 – Feb 
1994 
Aug 1997 – Jan 
1998 
Aug 1998 – Dec 
1998 
Jun 2000 – Nov 
2000 
 Two waves: 
Sept 92 – Oct 
93 































































































  39Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Birdsall and Griffin (1988) and Birdsall et al (2001) provide excellent overviews of the issue of poverty and 
fertility. 
2  Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) summarises these findings by suggesting that the pool of poor households 
consist of both chronic poor and transitory poor, where the latter is surprisingly large, and this is the case 
independent of whether poverty is measured in relative or absolute terms.  
3 See Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) for an approach where supply side effects are separated from demand side 
effects. 
4All figures quoted in this section come from the World Development Indicators database (see 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/) 
5 The urban population in Ethiopia is fifteen percent of the total. 
6 Doi Moi can be translated as “renovation”. 
7 Equivalent scales can be estimated by using Engel coefficient as in Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995). Although 
estimating the effect of household size on Engel coefficient requires a range of assumptions on the consumption 
behaviour of household, the theoretical foundation is certainly an advantage. Another avenue is to examine how 
sensitive the results are to the choice of equivalent scale. The weight on a child’s consumption relative to that 
on an adult and the scale of economy are two dimensions to be considered.  
8 The poverty lines in ALSMS and VLSMS are constructed by the World Bank. The poverty line for Ethiopia is 
based on the World Bank Approach and controls for regional prices, including controls for urban and rural 
areas. The poverty line for IFLS is constructed so that the provincial poverty rates in IFLS2(1997) replicate 
those in Strauss et al (2004). Strauss et al (2004) construct provincial poverty lines adjusted for regional prices 
and change in food basket of the reference group.  
9 We also estimated Negative Binomial models, but these produced very similar parameter estimates. 
10 Newborn children refer to new children of the Household Head. 
11 We also estimated negative binomial regressions, but these provided very similar estimates to the Poisson 
regressions. 
12 However, the different signs of the coefficients on poverty in Table 4 also suggest more investigation into 
income profile, composition of income, and access to credit market among poor and non-poor households in 
four countries.  
13 The overall literacy rate in Ethiopia was by 2000 around 30 percent. The literacy rate in urban areas is 
considerably higher than in rural areas.  
14 Working children may have a direct income effect, but it seems here negligible. 
15 This decline in poverty among farmers during the period has been attributed to particularly good harvests (see 
Bigsten et al 2003;  Dercon 2004). 
16 The contraceptive prevalence rate in rural Ethiopia is as low as 4 percent, whereas in urban areas it is round 
45 percent. 
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